Organizer: Danielle N. Lussier, Grinnell College, USA Chair: Joseph Chinyong Liow, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Discussants: Muhamad Ali, University of California, Riverside, USA; Ihsan Ali Fauzi, , Indonesia In the past decade Indonesia has embarked on a series of reforms that have democratized the political system and decentralized power. At the same time, it has experienced a resurgence of political Islam and the spread of social conservatism. This panel explores these themes through a focus on the contemporary politics of Indonesia. The multifaceted way Indonesia has reacted to global and local challenges provides an opportunity to analyze many relationships of interest to Asian studies—the balance between security and political freedom; decentralization and the integrity of the national government; democratization versus development priorities; and religious expression versus individual rights.
The papers presented on this panel each explore an aspect of democracy, governance, and peace-building through an analysis of an unusual empirical finding in Indonesia. All papers are based on information gathered from recent fieldwork in Indonesia and represent the freshest data available for analysis. Fish and Lussier ask a fundamental question: how has Indonesia overcome the obstacles of deprivation to become Southeast Asia’s most viable democracy? Epley examines the explosion of popular demonstrations in the post-Suharto era and the policy responses they elicit. Jung analyzes changing patterns in state-society relations through a focus on the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Buehler investigates the dynamics behind incumbency turnover in Indonesia’s first direct elections for local executives, arguing that a sophisticated form of particularistic politics has taken root. Lastly, Chernov et al look at variation in the effects of disengagement programs aimed at neutralizing radical Islamic groups.
Co-authored by Rizal Panggabean, Lecturer, Program for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Gadjah Mada University (Indonesia) Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, Lecturer, Paramadina University (Indonesia)
This paper examines Indonesia’s disengagement programs at the national level and in the province of Central Sulawesi. It poses three inter-related questions. First, to what extent members of Jemaah Islamiyah and KOMPAK are participating in disengagement programs in Indonesia? Second, to what extent have programs been successful in encouraging JI and KOMPAK members to eschew violent methods? Finally, to what extent has disengagement engendered deradicalization? This study contends that Indonesia’s disengagement programs have been woefully underfunded and, as a result have been limited in their scope. Unlike corresponding programs in Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia’s programs do not prioritize deradicalization of militants. There are no regular meetings with religious counselors. Instead, the programs have employed a “soft” approach to encourage the abandonment of violence through the use of material incentives and aid to families, in exchange for intelligence information to be used in combating JI terrorism. However, as our interviews with militants in Jakarta have shown, the radical ideology largely remains unchanged. One exception in many respects has been the programs in the province of Central Sulawesi, which have higher enrollment rates, a greater commitment to disengagement, and a comparatively lower rate of recidivism. This study will employ original fieldwork conducted in Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Tentana in July and August of 2010.
Incumbency turnover in Indonesia’s district executive elections is high. It is unclear why this is the case. One argument is that Indonesian voters have started to punish local politicians who engage in rent-seeking and reward those who adhere to ‘good governance’. However, many incumbents are voted out of office only to be replaced by candidates with an equally dismal corruption record. This paper will analyze dynamics behind incumbency turnover in Indonesia by looking at the first round of direct elections for district executives held between 2005 and 2008.
The relationships between Muslim organizations and the Indonesian state have changed as regime types have shifted over time. During the Sukarno era, Muslim organizations replaced some functions of Indonesia’s then weak state, while during the Suharto era, Muslim organizations were constrained and later co-opted by the then strong state. How have the relationships between them changed in Indonesia since its democratization in 1998?
Utilizing recent field research in Indonesia, this paper examines two major mass Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations have shown different responses to political engagement since democratization. By examining their congresses in particular, I argue that their internal decision-making structure and management style of organizational assets affect organizational engagement in politics. In doing so, I shed light on variations in the relationship between Muslim organizations and the state in democratizing Indonesia.
Beyond traditional or conventional forms of electoral participation, a popular type of political behavior in developing democracies is mass demonstrations. This is particularly the case in Indonesia after the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998. The political opportunity structure opened up to permit varied expressions oriented towards the state, and the mass public has taken advantage of this new freedom to actively voice their concerns, grievances, and recommendations. This paper investigates the emergence of popular demonstrations and the kinds of policy responses they elicit in contemporary Indonesian politics. Key questions include: Who are most likely to choose demonstrations as a form of political expression, and why? Are there analytical and practical differences for the size of demonstrations, participant backgrounds, type of public policies, and location (e.g., local versus national)? What kinds of intended or unintended consequences result from demonstrations? Making use of original mixed-methods fieldwork data from 2005-2007, this paper finds that political participation in the form of demonstrations can be influenced by individual and social demographic factors along with the presence of certain public policy issues, which can sometimes, but not always have a religious dimension.
Twenty years ago, no one would have predicted that Indonesia would become the most politically open regime in Southeast Asia. Open politics has proved fragile and vulnerable in the Philippines and Thailand—two regimes once considered the region’s best candidates for democratization. Over the past decade Indonesia has succeeded in liberalizing political institutions, broadening civil liberties, and decentralizing political authority. Existing theories of democracy would consider Indonesia an unlikely place for successful democratization. A country with pronounced poverty and low levels of socioeconomic development, a short independent statehood, a predominantly Muslim population and a history of violent separatist clashes and pervasive corruption is presumably an inhospitable place for open politics. How has Indonesia overcome these obstacles to become Southeast Asia’s most viable democracy?
In contrast to studies that focus on questions of governance in Indonesia post-Suharto, this paper is concerned with explaining the presence of an open political regime in a place where we would least expect it. We look at how Indonesia compares to its regional neighbors. Using data available from Keio University’s Research Survey of Political Society and the World Values Survey, as well as qualitative interviews conducted in Indonesia, we find that a key factor that sets Indonesia apart from its regional peers is its dense civil society. Dense social interactions, which are reinforced by Indonesia’s high degree of religiosity and religious observance, foster participation in political and civic life and contributes to a sense of community responsibility that has protected nascent democratic institutions from elite abuse.
Twenty years ago, no one would have predicted that Indonesia would become the most politically open regime in Southeast Asia. Open politics has proved fragile and vulnerable in the Philippines and Thailand—two regimes once considered the region’s best candidates for democratization. Over the past decade Indonesia has succeeded in liberalizing political institutions, broadening civil liberties, and decentralizing political authority. Existing theories of democracy would consider Indonesia an unlikely place for successful democratization. A country with pronounced poverty and low levels of socioeconomic development, a short independent statehood, a predominantly Muslim population and a history of violent separatist clashes and pervasive corruption is presumably an inhospitable place for open politics. How has Indonesia overcome these obstacles to become Southeast Asia’s most viable democracy?
In contrast to studies that focus on questions of governance in Indonesia post-Suharto, this paper is concerned with explaining the presence of an open political regime in a place where we would least expect it. We look at how Indonesia compares to its regional neighbors. Using data available from Keio University’s Research Survey of Political Society and the World Values Survey, as well as qualitative interviews conducted in Indonesia, we find that a key factor that sets Indonesia apart from its regional peers is its dense civil society. Dense social interactions, which are reinforced by Indonesia’s high degree of religiosity and religious observance, foster participation in political and civic life and contributes to a sense of community responsibility that has protected nascent democratic institutions from elite abuse.
This paper examines Indonesia’s disengagement programs at the national level and in the province of Central Sulawesi. It poses three inter-related questions. First, to what extent members of Jemaah Islamiyah and KOMPAK are participating in disengagement programs in Indonesia? Second, to what extent have programs been successful in encouraging JI and KOMPAK members to eschew violent methods? Finally, to what extent has disengagement engendered deradicalization? This study contends that Indonesia’s disengagement programs have been woefully underfunded and, as a result have been limited in their scope. Unlike corresponding programs in Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia’s programs do not prioritize deradicalization of militants. There are no regular meetings with religious counselors. Instead, the programs have employed a “soft” approach to encourage the abandonment of violence through the use of material incentives and aid to families, in exchange for intelligence information to be used in combating JI terrorism. However, as our interviews with militants in Jakarta have shown, the radical ideology largely remains unchanged. One exception in many respects has been the programs in the province of Central Sulawesi, which have higher enrollment rates, a greater commitment to disengagement, and a comparatively lower rate of recidivism. This study will employ original fieldwork conducted in Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Tentana in July and August of 2010.
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